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REPEATING, YET EVADING REVIEW: ADMITTING RELIABLE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN 
CRIMINAL CASES STILL DEPENDS UPON WHO IS ASKING 
 
Wes R. Porter• 
 
A trial court must find that the proponent of expert witness testimony has set forth adequate 
evidence that the testimony is based upon reliable methods and will be helpful to the trier of fact.1  
Much has been written regarding the reliability prong2 since the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,3 yet a severe prejudice to the criminally accused persists today in some trial 
courts’ analyses of the often overlooked helpfulness prong.  Despite the straight-forward articulation 
of helpfulness, described as “fit” or mere relevance, some trial courts apply the helpfulness prong 
differently depending upon whether the expert testimony is offered by a criminal defendant or the 
government.4  Reviewing courts must afford great deference to these decisions so steeped in the 
facts of the case.5  After discussing the stark contrast between admissibility determinations excluding 
                                                 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Adjunct Law Professor (Associate Law Professor beginning in 2010-11); 
author of Expert Witnesses: Criminal Cases (Thomson-Reuters ed., 2009). 
1 Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2009).  Rule 702 embodies “three distinct substantive restrictions on the admission of expert 
testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit.”  Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000); see generally 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993) (discussing factors that may be considered in assessing 
scientific reliability); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997).   
2 The majority of the appellate decisions and scholarly comments related to expert testimony, particularly since the 
Court’s 1993 decision in Daubert have centered on reliability.   
3 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
4 See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (Rule 702's fit requirement admits “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88 (referencing 
the “liberal” federal rules of evidence and “the basic standard of relevance”). 
5 Abuse of discretion is the governing standard of review in expert witness cases.  See Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 141-42.  
"Decisions concerning the admissibility of expert testimony 'lie within the broad discretion of the trial court' and will not 
be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion."  Jenkins v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 140 
F.3d 1161, 1165 (8th Cir. 1998). 




the defendant’s expert testimony about eyewitness identifications and admitting expert testimony 
from law enforcement witnesses, this article will analyze the reoccurring issue through the lens of 
the reviewing courts. 6 
         
One of the unfortunate truths in criminal litigation is that trial courts frequently admit 
testimony from the government’s experts and exclude the defendant’s proposed expert testimony.7  
Almost ten years ago, Professor D. Michael Risinger wrote that he feared that the criminal defendant 
would not be protected from conviction by the exclusion of “undependable expert testimony” 
because “prosecution [expert] witnesses almost always allowed to testify,” yet the defendant’s 
proffered expert testimony was, and still is, “rejected in a majority of cases.”8  Professor Risinger’s 
article surveyed weaker government experts who had been allowed through the trial courts’ gates9 
relative to the defendant’s experts that were kept out.10  Most prophetically, Professor Risinger 
observed that while defense experts, at that time, were often not permitted to testify regarding 
eyewitness testimony, police officers and other law enforcement officials testified "concerning the 
general way criminal schemes and enterprises operate."11   
 
Despite the scientific advances in the field of witness identification and ten more years of 
post-Daubert guidance, the disparate trial court rulings continue today.  Some trial courts still exclude 
experts with reliable information about witness identifications and admit testimony from law 
enforcement officers covering irrelevant, unhelpful and unfairly prejudicial topics derived from their 
inherent bias.  It begs the questions explored in this article: Why?  What reasoning and by what 
specific language do trial courts reach these irreconcilable results?  Can reviewing court remedy this 
fundamental injustice that prejudices the criminal defendant?   
 
                                                 
6 See infra Sections II and III; Fed. R. Evid. 401 & 402.  “[A]ny doubts regarding the admissibility of expert testimony 
should be resolved in favor of admission.” Probatter Sports, LLC. v. Joyner Tech., Inc., 2007 WL 3285799 *4 (N.D. 
Iowa 2007) (citing Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 758 (8th Cir. 2006)); “[T]he rejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Robinson v. GEICO General Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 
2006); see In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 670 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591)(emphasizing that 
“[t]his requirement [of ‘fit’] is one of relevance and expert evidence which does not relate to an issue in the case is not 
helpful”).  The Supreme Court recognized that the “fit” requirement “goes primarily to relevance,” but it obviously did 
not intend the second prong of Rule 702 to be merely a reiteration of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 402. 
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.  Rule 702 set forth the “helpfulness” standard which requires a valid scientific connection to the 
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.  
7 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock? 64 ALB. L. REV. 
99 (2000) (hereinafter “Navigating”)(collecting statistics about reported post-Daubert cases including in federal criminal 
cases).  As of 2000, the date of his article, Professor Risinger noted that the government typically survived challenges to 
its expert testimony and the criminal defendant’s expert testimony was excluded as much as 66% of the time.  Id. at 109-
110.  
8 See id. at 100, 132.   
9 See id. at 112-21 (discussing “syndrome” experts such as those who testify about Rape Trauma Syndrome and Post 
Traumatic Stress Syndrome); id. at 121-24 (intoxication test of horizontal gaze nystagmus experts); id at 135-39 (bite-
mark experts); id at 139-42 (handwriting experts).  
10 See id. at 134-35 (referencing false identification expert in comparison law enforcement experts).   
11 See id. at 132. 




The last great hope for the accused who are short-changed in their bids to present expert 
testimony is two-fold:  first, to create a trial record that fully elucidates the ways in which the trial 
court “exercised its discretion;” and, second, to successfully argue for appellate courts to review de 
novo a lower court’s compliance with the Daubert framework12 or a record that demonstrates unfair 
treatment. 
 
As distinguished from Professor Risinger’s article and the work of other scholars,13 this 
article has removed the reliability prong from its analysis, and focuses instead on courts’ treatment 
of qualified experts employing reliable methods under the helpfulness prong.  By isolating 
helpfulness,14 the prejudice to the accused becomes more vivid and the need for more robust 
appellate review more urgent.  This article first explores the language and reasoning articulated by 
some trial courts in reaching the paradoxical admissibility determinations.  This article discusses how 
egregiously divergent admissibility determinations depend on whether the government or the 
criminal defendant proposes the expert testimony.  To illustrate this contention, this article profiles 
witness identification expert testimony typically offered by the defendant as compared to expert 
testimony from law enforcement witnesses for the government.  This article then describes the way 
in which the disparate admissibility determinations by the trial court escape meaningful review.  
Lastly, this article discusses the possible avenues to a more fruitful appellate review through more 
appropriate standards of review and importing other trial courts’ Daubert analysis.     
 
I. Expert Testimony Is Different 
 
Trial courts treat expert testimony, and decisions related to its admissibility, differently.  A 
professional witness permitted to educate and opine on helpful topics and issues long has carried 
great weight with the jury.  Expert testimony, since the origins of our adversary system, contributes a 
badge of legitimacy and an aura of independent, unbiased support to a party’s case presentation.15  
In terms of constructing a defense and refuting the government’s theory of prosecution, testimony 
from an expert can be invaluable to a criminal defendant.  Admissibility decisions governing expert 
testimony enjoy greater attention and a heightened standard of scrutiny from trial courts under Rule 
702, Daubert and its progeny.  This includes the helpfulness prong.   
 
                                                 
12 See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1105 (7th Cir. 1999). 
13 See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, The Admission of Unreliable Expert Testimony Offered by the Prosecution: What’s Wrong with Daubert 
and How to Make it Right, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 131 (discussing the reliability prong of Daubert  and trial courts’ role in 
“shaping” methodology while focusing on the government’s experts testifying about bite-marks and future 
dangerousness in sentencing).   
14 This article does not discuss reliability determinations or the application of Daubert, Kuhmo Tire and its progeny.  The 
discussion here, instead, assumes a qualified expert testifying based on reliable methods.  Even in states that do not 
follow Daubert, some form of relevance is incorporated into the trial court’s admissibility determinations.  
15 While a defendant may have some defense to criminal charges levied by the government, a defense can truly benefit 
from the teachings and opinions of a professional witness.  Compare United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 
1994) (excluding the witness identification expert because of the “powerful nature of expert testimony”) with United States 
v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 338-39 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that there is “no suggestion, however, that such an aura of 
reliability [of the expert testimony] was unwarranted in this case”) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 594). 




Several other reasons may exist for the heightened scrutiny and, consequently, may explain 
why criminal defendants fall victim to disparate admissibility determinations by some trial courts.16  
First, trial courts were labeled as gatekeepers by the Court in Daubert,17 and some trial courts seem to 
confuse their role with the label, which applies to the reliability prong not discussed in this article.18  
Trial courts have always been the “evidentiary gatekeepers” and Daubert merely incorporated a 
familiar relevance component into its test.  Second, some trial courts misapprehend “helpfulness” to 
apply more generally to the criminal process, and deny the accused reliable expert testimony, in an 
effort to encourage plea bargaining.19  Third, as explored here, some trial courts seem to engage in 
unwelcome protectionism20 and impose subjective value judgments when considering the 
admissibility of reliable expert testimony.21   The judicial protectionism described in this article 
prejudices the accused and compromises justice as well as the public’s perception of the criminal 
justice system.22         
 
II. Excluding Reliable Expert Testimony From the Defendant  
 
Trial courts employ the legal reasoning and language profiled below to effect seemingly pre-
determined admissibility decisions to exclude the defendant’s expert testimony.  Some trial courts, in 
so doing, insert their subjective value judgments about the defendant’s case, theory of the defense or 
the proposed expert’s contribution (or disruption) to the trial.  The false identification experts 
profiled below illustrate but one example of the raised admissibility hurdle that some courts reserve 








                                                 
16  The problems discussed herein are not universal, but rather the product of some lower court decisions and reflective 
of a circuit split.  See infra note 40. 
17 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7; see also Leslie Morsek, Get On Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs, the Twists, 
and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kuhmo's Expansion of 
Daubert, 34 AKRON L. REV. 689 (2001). 
18 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95; see also United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995) (excluding the defendant’s 
expert testimony under Daubert’s reliability prong when he failed to provide the trial court support for the opinion).   
19 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (Nov. 1976). 
20 Judicial protectionism, as used throughout this note, occurs when a trial court injects subjective value judgments into 
its decision making and protects an image of the trial as it is, at least in the court’s view, supposed to proceed.  
21 See Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that when deciding the reliability prong, the 
district court must “must rule out ‘subjective belief’” of the  expert witness).  Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit upheld 
the trial court’s exclusion of an identification expert, stating simply that “expert testimony relating to eyewitness 
identification is strongly disfavored” and injected its own subjective belief in the determination.  See United States v. 
Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1105 (7th Cir. 1999). 
22 See infra Section V: The Cry for DeNovo Review in Limited Circumstances and, in the Alternative, Uncovering Abuse 
in Trial Courts’ Discretion (discussing how trial courts’ irreconcilable admissibility determinations escape meaningful 
review and evade public knowledge when even findings of error lay buried beneath the harmless error standard).    




A. Early Trial Courts Considering Witness Identification Experts 
 
Trial courts initially considered expert testimony about false identification more than 20 
years ago.23  The prosecution must establish identity, and it is among the earliest foundations of our 
criminal justice system that the prosecution typically relies on eyewitness testimony.  The first courts 
to consider testimony about witness identifications easily dismissed it as either not “generally 
accepted” under Frye v. United States24 or, more applicable to the discussion here, as invasive to the 
jury’s exclusive role to access witness credibility.25  The former was a reliability issue; the latter fell 
under the helpfulness prong.  Partially based upon a value judgment about the defendant and the 
defendant’s case, the earlier trial courts seem to have been unwilling to allow the testimony of an 
expert, such as a psychologist or physician, to convolute the otherwise straight-forward issue of 
identity and the historic importance of eyewitness testimony.26   
 
Under the reliability prong, like other novel expert testimony, the research and empirical 
evidence related to witness identifications developed.  Psychologists, studies and legal scholars 
gradually exposed the fallibility of witness identifications.27  The seminal event which brought the 
witness identification discussion to the forefront was the advent of DNA testing, particularly during 
post-conviction review.28  As one commentator observed, “the influence of improper suggestion 
upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single 
                                                 
23 See United States v. Ameral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973)(excluding the testimony as not necessary); but see United v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985)(recognizing nearly 25 years ago that Rule 702 may permit “testimony 
concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications”).  
24 Some states continue to follow Frye: Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and Washington.  Other 
states have not outright rejected Frye, yet apply Daubert factors (so-called hybrid states): Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Hampshire and New Jersey.  Other states have created their own tests: Georgia, Utah, Virginia and 
Wisconsin. See, e.g., Hamilton-King v. HNTB Georgia, Inc., 2009 WL 737044 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting Daubert).  The 
rest of the states follow Daubert.  
25 The jury is the judge of witness credibility at trial, a role that trial courts are careful not to permit invasion. See State v. 
McCutcheon, 781 P.2d 31 (Ariz. 1989) (excluding expert testimony because the real purpose would have been to attack 
credibility of specific witness); cf. Mathis, 264 F.3d at 338 (rejecting the government’s argument that false identification 
testimony might usurp the jury’s role as judge of witness credibility). 
26 Also, these early courts did not use outcome–determinative language discussed in this article; instead, the Frye standard 
of reliability that applied at the time, the state of the research in the field and the legitimate concerns of usurping the 
jury’s role as arbiter of credibility were sound legal determinations.  This unwillingness may be explained, at least in large 
part, by reference to the principles underlying the later-devised reliability prong in Daubert.    
27 University of California at Irvine Law Professor Elizabeth Loftus is one of the nation's leading experts on memory. 
Her experiments reveal how a memory can be altered by suggestions and events after it was original formed. She was 
recently interviewed about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications on CBS's 60 Minutes.  See 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4852677n. 
28  Studies about conviction reversals due to DNA indicate that a significant percentage involved an eyewitness 
identification that turned out to false.  See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful 
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  McMurtrie observes that "[r]esearch over the 
past thirty years has shown that expert testimony on memory and eyewitness identification is the only legal safeguard 
that is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness errors." Id. at 1276. Studies have shown that erroneous identification 
accounted for as much as eighty-five percent of the convictions of those individuals later exonerated by DNA testing.  
Id. at 1275 n.17. 




factor – perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.”29  False 
identification by an eyewitness was described as the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions, 
playing a role in more than 75% of convictions overturned through DNA testing, according to the 
Innocence Project.30     
 
Trailing science, courts began to recognize the sea change with respect to false identification 
expert testimony and its reliability and general acceptance in the field.31  Scholars have noted that 
expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification is firmly rooted in 
experimental foundation, psychological research on human perception and memory and impressive 
peer review literature.32  Specifically, a qualified expert witness in the field of eyewitness 
identifications may testify about the limitations of cross-racial identifications,33 human perceptions in 
“high stress environments,” “weapon focus” and whether the witness was subsequently exposed to 
memory-altering “post-event” information or reassurances by investigators.  Further, expert 
witnesses have testified that the process on an out-of-court identification, including those in error, 
serve to create or reinforce memory,34 that the degree of confidence in the identification bears little 
relation to its accuracy35 and that identifications favor the closest resemblance to our memory among 
the options available, whether or not the perpetrator was included among the selections.   
 
                                                 
29 Patrick Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, at 26 (1965) (his doctoral thesis). 
30 Innocence Project, Eyewitness reforms gain momentum nationwide, Apr. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/525.php; see also Justice for All Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. § 14136 (2006). 
31 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that Rule 702 may permit “testimony 
concerning reliability of eyewitness identifications”). 
32 Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 889-90 
(2005) (footnotes omitted).  Scientifically tested studies, subject to peer review, have identified legitimate areas of 
concern.  See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1277 n.29 (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 
14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990) (concluding that jurors were insensitive to many factors that influence 
eyewitness memory and give disproportionate weight to the confidence of the witness); Timothy P. O'Toole, et al., 
District of Columbia Public Defender Eyewitness Reliability Survey, Champion 28-32 (Apr. 2005) (finding, in a survey of 
approximately 1,000 potential jurors, that they overestimate the reliability of cross-racial identification); Gary Wells, et 
al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations For Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 619-20 
(1998); Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges' Knowledge and Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. REV. 
6, 8-14 (2003) (finding that judges had limited understanding regarding eyewitness accuracy and confidence and with 
studies indicating that half or more of all wrongful felony conviction are due to eyewitness misidentification). 
33 See United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding identifications to be far less accurate when 
witnesses are identifying perpetrators of a different race); United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp 1132, 1137 (D.N.J. 
1996) (district court weighing in favor of cross-racial identification expert testimony, as well as weapon focus and stress). 
34 State v. Raff, 2007 WL 5129727 (Cal. Super.)(expert declaration) (describing that “[r]esearch also demonstrates that 
witnesses tend to become increasingly committed to their identification over time. Witnesses want to appear consistent 
with what they have said before.  One study found that eyewitnesses who publicly stated their choices stayed with even 
incorrect choices, 78 percent of the time”).   
35 See United States v. Mathias, 264 F.3d 321, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the government’s argument to 
exclude the expert testimony about witness identifications “cannot succeed”); cf. United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 
(3d Cir. 2006) (finding that the trial court improperly excluded testimony concerning the relationship between the 
eyewitness’s confidence in the identification and the accuracy of that identification). 




Critically, courts have recognized that witness identification has been shown to be utterly 
counter-intuitive.36  Studies demonstrate that average lay persons, such as jurors, not only are not 
familiar with the concepts at the core of these areas of expert testimony but, if left on their own, 
instinctively arrive at the contrary assumptions.37  For example, a juror considering testimony from 
an eye-witness at trial mistakenly believes that high stress makes perception and memory more acute 
and that a witness who proclaims “100% confidence” during an identification of a criminal 
defendant translates to a more reliable identification.  A qualified expert witness offering testimony 
based upon the reliable methods can only serve to “assist the trier of fact” under these 
circumstances by presenting the empirical evidence and information that states otherwise.  Yet, as 
discussed below, some trial courts hold close to the notions that jurors can do it on their own38 or 
admitting the expert testimony will unduly prejudice the government.    
 
While there may be meaningful debate about the reliability of some novel areas of expert 
testimony, the admissibility of reliable expert testimony about witness identifications, however, 
should be beyond debate in prosecutions including eyewitness identification evidence.39  Still, 
however, some trial courts exclude expert testimony about eyewitness identifications from qualified 
witnesses offering testimony based upon reliable science under the helpfulness prong.  Reviewing 
courts typically affirm the decisions as not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.40  Reviewing courts 
                                                 
36 State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107, 1124 n.12 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause many of the empirical 
findings [regarding false identifications] . . . are highly counterintuitive, I fail to understand how defense counsel could 
effectively impeach an eyewitness’s identification during closing argument without recourse to expert testimony.”)   
37 See Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 FED. CTS. 
L. REV. 3 (discussing the misconceptions of jurors call for expert testimony, particularly when eye witness testimony is 
portrayed as “gospel to jurors”); Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. O'Toole, Catharine Easterly, Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
Beyond The Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 214 (2006) 
(demonstrating how jurors misunderstand how memory generally works and how particular factors, such as the effects 
of stress or the use of a weapon and affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony); see also United States v. Smith, 621 F. 
Supp. 2d 1207, 1209-10 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (summarizing the research and developments in eyewitness identification 
expert testimony).   
38 See infra Section III.C.2 (discussing when expert testimony is “beyond the ken” of the jury’s understanding). 
39 Similar to other types of expert witnesses, who might testify about the flaws of a computerized filing system or the 
proper interpretation of satellite photographs, experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to pertinent aspects of the 
human mind and body should generally be welcomed by courts, not turned away.  
40 Compare United States v. Mathias, 264 F.3d 321, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2001) (calling witness identification expert testimony 
“welcome”); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing a judicial trend toward, 
and an empirically supported need for, accepting expert testimony about eyewitness identification); United States v. 
Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 276-77 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the identification expert testimony “assist[s]” the trier of fact; 
“and quite possibly an expert such as a psychologist familiar with identification problems could give the jury background 
information about the mechanism of memory, types of errors, error rates, and other information not commonly 
possessed by the jury-information that may even be at odds with what a judge or juror might expect”) with United States 
v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2004)(affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude false identification expert 
testimony); United States v. Smith, 132 F.3d 1355, 1359 (excluding expert testimony on witness identifications); see also 
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996)(excluding expert testimony about witness identifications on the 
ground that the testimony “fail[ed] to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge’ under Daubert's first prong”). 




typically affirm decisions to deny a criminal defendant attempting to enlist the assistance of experts 
to testify about eyewitness identifications.41 
 
B. The Reasoning and Language Used to Exclude 
 
Some trial courts equip themselves with several arrows in the quiver of outcome-
determinative language.  The judicial reasoning justifying exclusion includes that the proposed expert 
witness’ testimony about witness identifications usurps the jury’s role, is within the common 
understanding of the ordinary juror,42 can be adequately addressed by cross-examination,43 causes 
undue prejudice or confusion to the jury44 and is not necessary because of the ample other evidence of 
guilt.45  For a standard described as relevance in Rules 401 and 402, the above represents the 
heightened attention to the helpfulness prong and the significant effort taken by some trial courts to 
disinvite a defendant’s expert to trial.  
 
1. Usurpation of the jury’s role of judging credibility 
 
No witness, including an expert qualified in the relevant field, may invade the jury’s exclusive 
role as judge of witness credibility.  An expert witness, thus, cannot extend the testimony about 
witness identification to include whether or not an eyewitness in the case should be believed or not.    
Short of an opinion that a witness should, or should not, be believed, the expert testimony simply 
does not usurp the jury’s exclusive role in judging credibility.  Today, most expert witnesses, 
including those testifying about witness identification, carefully craft their disclosures and opinions 
to “assist the jury” more generally and to steer clear of any opinion about another trial witness. 46   
 
Yet, for the criminal defendant seeking to incorporate expert testimony related to witness 
identifications offered against him at trial, some trial courts contort the usurpation argument.47  
Some trial courts blindly maintain that even general expert testimony about witness identification 
invades the province of the jury because it relates to the jury’s role in judging credibility.48  Merely 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
42 See People v. Johnson, 759 N.Y.S.2d 260 (4th Dep't 2003)(finding witness identification was not beyond the ken of the 
ordinary juror); but see infra Section III (discussing law enforcement experts permitted to testify about ordinary topics).  
43 See Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 
STETSON L. REV. 727 (2007) (exploring how ineffective cross examination is in the false identification context). 
44 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
45 Forecasting that any error would be harmless.  See, e.g., Martin, 391 F.3d at 954; Kime, 99 F.3d at 883.     
46 See e.g., United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 400 (C.M.A.  1993)(rape trauma expert made it clear that her testimony 
was to give a framework within which to consider the arguments made by the defense in the context of what happens in 
some rape cases, but she would not usurp the role of the fact finder.  Specifically, in order to avoid confusing the jury, 
she testified that she was seeking to aid the court members, but they had to determine whether an offense was 
committed).  
47 See Martin, 391 F.3d at 954 (describing the expert’s testimony as related “only to the general reliability of eyewitness 
identifications” and then excluding it). 
48 See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357-60 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1103-08 (7th 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-85 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 275-78 (1st Cir. 1995).  




relating to the jury’s role, however, cannot be the standard.  There are federal rules of evidence 
intended to bear on the issues of witness credibility and, ultimately, to assist the trier of fact in their 
decisions about witness credibility.49  Conversely, other trial courts, also under the helpfulness prong, 
exclude the testimony because it is “not sufficiently tailored to the facts of the case.”50  It is difficult 
to rationalize how testimony, even general testimony, about the inherent problems of eyewitness 
testimony is not relevant, or does not “fit,” in a prosecution that presents testimony about an 
eyewitness identification of the defendant.    
 
These trial courts place the criminal defendant in an untenable position between respecting 
the jury’s role as the judge of witness credibility and offering expert testimony sufficiently tailored to 
the instant case.  If the expert witness’ testimony relates to the identification at issue in the case, then 
it is a usurpation of the jury’s role (damned if you do); if the expert testimony generally applies to 
witness identifications, then they are not sufficiently tailored and, thus, not helpful (damned if you 
don’t).                     
 
2. Not beyond the ken of the ordinary juror 
 
Some trial courts have found that jurors do not need assistance with eyewitness testimony 
and identification of the defendant.  These trial courts claim that the issues common to 
identification testimony, such as weapon focus, cross-racial limitations and post-event 
contamination, are not “beyond the ken of the ordinary juror.”51  Stated differently, because the jury 
is capable of determining the strength of the witness’ identification on its own, expert testimony 
would not be “helpful.”  It is difficult to comport this judicial reasoning with the discussion above 
about jurors’ counter-intuitive assumptions about eyewitness identifications.52  The research and 
empirical evidence supports a clear need for expert testimony to prevent jury misconceptions and 
                                                 
49 See Fed. R. Evid. 607-609 (Article VI), where all the modes of impeachment of witnesses, opinions and reputation as 
to a witness’ character for truthfulness and prior convictions can be used by the jury in fulfilling their role of evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses.  Thus, a witness who heard that a witness has a poor reputation for truthfulness and a witness’ 
felony conviction for assault are admissible to assist the jury in accessing the witness’ credibility, yet testimony from a 
qualified expert witness about reliable information about identifications is excluded by some trial courts.   
50 See People v. Radcliffe, 743 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Super. 2002)(describing how trial courts should correlate proffered 
expert testimony with the facts of the case to demonstrate its helpfulness); cf. United States v. Sutherland, 191 Fed. 
Appx. 737, 740-41 (10th Cir. 2006)(unpublished)(admitting the government’s law enforcement expert despite a failure 
narrowly tailor the testimony to the particular case). 
51  See generally Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges' Knowledge and Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. 
REV. 6 (2003); but see United States v. Davis, 457 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the jury did not need expert 
testimony explaining the details of sentencing procedures to understand that the government's witnesses might have an 
incentive to incriminate a co-defendant).  Davis is a good example of when a jury truly understands the subject of the 
testimony and expert testimony would not be helpful. 
52 See supra notes 47-48; see also Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. O'Toole, Catharine Easterly, Elizabeth F. Loftus, 
Beyond The Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 214 
(2006)(demonstrating that jurors misunderstand how memory generally works and how the effects of stress or a weapon 
affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony).  




misassumptions.53  Expert testimony about eyewitness identification should be admitted because the 
jury cannot do it alone.  
   
There are clear-cut instances in which expert testimony offers educational information 
outside of a lay person’s common knowledge.  With closer proposed expert witness testimony, the 
trial court is faced with an unenviable task of accessing the collective knowledge and cognitive 
abilities of a group of laypersons whom the court likely has not met.  Because helpfulness is on par 
with relevance, trial courts should resolve these issues in favor of admitting the testimony.  Some 
trial courts, however, do not admit the testimony when the defendant is the proponent of the 
evidence.  At the very least, a consistent standard should apply to the government and the criminal 
defendant and reviewing courts should not be powerless to correct any inequities.   
 
3. Adequately addressed by the judicial process 
 
Some trial courts also have found that expert testimony about witness identifications is not 
necessary because the judicial process can adequately substitute for the expert testimony.  These 
courts often refer specifically to cross-examination and jury instructions.54  In the eyewitness 
identification context, some trial courts believe that it is sufficient for the defendant to cross 
examine the eyewitness, a layperson, who, like the jurors, lacks any understanding of the limitations of 
his own identification and testimony.55  The criminal defendant may not present expert testimony 
from a qualified witness based upon reliable scientific evidence because of the “opportunity” to cross 
examine a lay witness is held sufficient to protect his rights.56  Even the appellate courts finding the 
above logic erroneous inevitably find the error harmless.     
 
Only very rarely do courts exclude otherwise probative and reliable testimony on the 
grounds that the proponent’s right to cross examine another witness is sufficient.  What is most 
perplexing about excluding the defendant’s expert on this basis is that expert testimony too is a part 
of the judicial process and equally rooted in the early formation of the criminal justice system.  There 
                                                 
53 See supra notes 47-51; cf. People v. Austin, 833 N.Y.S.2d 325 (4th Dep't  2007) (finding expert testimony on 
identifications not helpful when four of the identifying witnesses knew defendant for many years).  
54 United States v. Bellamy, 26 Fed. Appx. 250 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997), 
reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 124 F.3d 223 (11th Cir. 1997).  "Jurors using common sense and their faculties of 
observation can judge the credibility of an eyewitness identification, especially since deficiencies or inconsistencies in an 
eyewitness's testimony can be brought out with skillful cross-examination.”  United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
55 The line of questioning on cross examination unassisted by the information involved in the expert testimony may 
appear like this:    
Q: You do understand that because the perpetrator had a gun, studies say that your identification may be less 
accurate? 
A: No, I don’t understand that. 
56 For a good example of a cross examination incorporating many of the issues surrounding witness identification, see 
generally State v. White, 2007 WL 5248507 (Cal. Super.) (expert trial testimony). 




is no support for a trial court’s finding that the opportunity for cross-examination trumps the ability 
to present expert testimony.  The criminal defendant would certainly choose differently. 57    
 
Appellate courts also reference the trial courts’ jury instructions as justification for the 
exclusion of the defendant’s expert testimony about eyewitness identifications.58  The only 
evidentiary finding that resembles witness exclusion on account of other evidence is when evidence 
is deemed a “needless presentation of cumulative evidence” under Rule 403.59  Even then, the trial 
court excludes the proposed evidence because the court evaluated other, similar evidence already 
before the jury.  Here, trial courts have excluded an expert witness on account of the mere ability to cross 
examine a percipient witness at trial or because of the court’s instructions to the jury.  Exclusion on 
the basis of other aspects of the criminal trial is aberrant judicial behavior underlying a decision 
supposedly governed by the liberal standard of relevance.                   
 
4. Unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues 
 
The helpfulness prong of the Daubert test also implicates Rule 403 considerations.60  That is, 
a trial court may exclude reliable and helpful expert testimony from a qualified witness if the 
testimony’s probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury.”61  The Court in Daubert commented “[e]xpert evidence can be 
both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.  Because of that risk, 
the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules 
exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”62  States not following Daubert also rely 
on 403 considerations to exclude expert testimony about eyewitness identification.63  
 
Some trial courts have excluded the defendant’s reliable witness identification expert 
testimony reasoning that its admission will cause unfair prejudice to the government.64  There are several 
                                                 
57 See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 939 (2d Cir. 1993).  Rule 702, however, requires only that an expert have 
“some specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.”  There is no requirement that prohibits a government 
agent from testifying as an expert merely because an accomplice witness, another part of the judicial process, is also 
available.  Id. 
58 See United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1994).  “The district court instructed the jury to consider 
whether: (1) the eyewitness had the capacity and adequate opportunity to observe the offender based upon the length of 
time for observation as well as the conditions of observation; (2) the identification was the product of the eyewitness's 
own recollection or was the result of subsequent influence or suggestiveness; (3) the eyewitness has made inconsistent 
identifications; and (4) the eyewitness was credible.  . . .Finally, it permitted the jury to consider, as a factor bearing upon 
the reliability of the eyewitness testimony, the length of time which may have elapsed between the occurrence of the 
crime and the eyewitness's identification.” Id. 
59 Under Rule 403, the district court has discretion to exclude evidence that is unfairly prejudicial where its effect is 
merely cumulative.  FED. R. EVID. 403; see e.g., United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997). 
60 SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir. 1992). 
61 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
62  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
63  See People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 434-35 (Cal. 1995)(excluding the expert testimony on the grounds of, inter alia, 
Rule 403 considerations under the Kelly-Frye test). 
64See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that there was a “very real danger that the 
proffered expert testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert's credibility assessment for its 




concerns with trial courts’ findings that the high probative value of the false identification expert’s 
testimony, discussed above in Section II.A, is somehow outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the government.  First, in the criminal trial and because of the government’s burden of 
proof, trial courts more regularly evaluate prejudice befallen on the accused under Rule 403.  Second 
and more specific to the false identification discussion, reliable expert testimony that informs jurors 
that their collective instincts and assumptions with respect to certain of the government’s evidence 
might be misplaced cannot prejudice the government unfairly.  No party, especially the government in a 
criminal case, is unduly prejudiced when a trial court admits testimony or evidence from its 
adversary that refutes a fact of consequence, promotes the proper weighing of evidence and assists 
the jury with its key duty of judging witness credibility.  Finally, as argued herein, the only true unfair 
prejudice within a trial court’s purview when considering expert testimony about witness 
identification belongs to the accused and that prejudice must be redressed by appellate courts. 
 
Also under Rule 403, some trial courts exclude false identification expert testimony on the 
grounds that it will confuse issues for the jury.65  Evaluating the potential confusion that may rise to 
the level of exclusion amidst the more overarching confusion lay persons experience when they 
become jurors is no small task.  Yet, when jurors instinctively believe one way and an expert witness 
purports to testify that their assumptions and beliefs are in error, this cannot constitute the kind of 
confusion that the rules of evidence were designed to prevent.  Trial courts determining the 
admissibility of information that educates jurors and dispels their common misconceptions, to the 
extent governed by Rule 403, should err on the side of inclusion.  When the expert testimony is 
admitted, not only does the jury better understand a fact of consequence, the eyewitness 
identification, but the expert testimony assists them with, as opposed to usurps from them, their 
most basic role of accessing witness credibility.      
 
5. Foreshadowing Harmless Error, Trial Courts Weigh “Other Evidence of Guilt” 
 
For some trial courts, the criminal defendant’s right to offer expert testimony turns on the 
other evidence of guilt in the case.66  These trial courts evaluate the government’s evidence in limine 
(i.e. before trial) to consider the “importance” of the eyewitness identification that the defendant’s 
false identification expert proposes to address.67  If the government’s eyewitness identification is, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
own”); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that an exclusion of the expert testimony 
was “a proper exercise of its discretion, whether under Rule 702 or Rule 403.”); cf. Buscaglia v. United States¸25 F.3d 
530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the trial court committed clear error by excluding expert testimony under Rule 
403 in a bench trial). 
65 See United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “given the powerful nature of expert 
testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead the jury, we cannot say the district court erred in concluding that the 
proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the jury”).   
66 See, e.g. United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 445 F. Supp. 2d 190, 192-93 (D.P.R. 2006) (weighing other evidence of 
guilt when deciding admissibility at the trial court level).  The reasoning is common on appeal and not unique to 
admissibility decisions concerning expert testimony or the eyewitness identification expert.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Alexander, 816 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing as clearly erroneous the decision to exclude testimony on 
photographic comparison where entire case turned on photographic identification). 
67 Rodriguez-Berrios, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93 (“having considered the importance to the government’s case”); see also 
Evans v. State, 581 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 




instance, corroborated by multiple eyewitness identifications, physical evidence, a confession or, 
ironically, the government’s expert testimony probative of identity such as a DNA or fingerprint 
expert, then the defendant may not be entitled to his reliable expert testimony about the eyewitness 
identification.68  The timing of this judicial inquiry ignores that other identifications could suffer 
from the same issues that an expert witness would refute during his trial testimony.  Further, as it 
relates to other evidence, a confession may later be excluded as unreliable69 and the government’s 
other identity evidence, such as fingerprints and handwriting, may be substantively refuted at trial as 
well.70    
 
This ground for excluding the defendant’s proffered expert testimony strains logic and 
cannot possibly comport with an admissibility determination under the liberal standard of relevance.  
Someone unfamiliar with the American criminal justice system mistakenly may believe that a trial 
court might favor a criminal defendant more in trials where greater evidence of guilt has been offered 
against him.  Not so in this context.  Here, to the contrary, some trial courts exclude reliable expert 
witness testimony about witness identifications because of the strength of the government’s other 
evidence of guilt to be adduced at trial.   
 
The criminal defendant, extending the logic of these trial courts, only enjoys the right to 
offer reliable expert testimony from a qualified witness on the issue of eyewitness identification if it 
is the only, or most important, evidence of guilt.71  As the judicial reasoning follows, the criminal 
defendant shall not be permitted to offer expert testimony helpful to the jury unless it can be used to 
break the only (or best) strand of evidence supporting his guilt.  Because trial courts treat expert 
testimony differently, a trial court’s weighing other evidence of guilt in rendering an admissibility 





                                                 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, No. 01 CR 783, 2003 WL 22682360 (N.D. Ill).  “In this case, the facts do not create an 
unusual or compelling situation in which the aid of an expert witness is required. . . .  However, identification testimony 
will not be the only evidence that the government offers . . . the government intends to introduce corroborating 
evidence which links Carter to the getaway car used in the robbery.”  Id. at 6. 
69 See Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1 (Spring 2008); Richard A. Leo, Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Tenty-First 
Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479. 
70 See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing the merits of defendant’s challenges to the 
government’s fingerprint and handwriting evidence and expert testimony). 
71 It is improper for a trial court when determining admissibility of expert testimony to conduct an analysis similar to that 
of an appellate court’s harmless error test. Compare Carter, 2003 WL 22682360 at *6 (N.D. Ill)(considering the strength 
of the government’s other evidence pretrial) with United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 317 (6th Cir. 2000)(“[E]xpert 
testimony should be admitted ... when there is no other inculpatory evidence presented against the Defendant with the 
exception of a small number of eyewitness identifications.”); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir.1986) 
(“[I]n a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of 
that identification is admissible and properly may be encouraged.”). 
72 See infra Section V.B. Requiring a Better Record for Abuse. 




III. Admitting Expert Testimony from Law Enforcement Witnesses 
 
The 2000 Amendments to the Rule 702 added “specialized knowledge” to the previous 
categories of “scientific and technical” knowledge.  A witness’ qualifications to offer specialized 
knowledge may be based entirely on training and experience, without the need for education, 
research, and more traditional distinctions, associated with an expert.  Accordingly, any witness may 
be capable of presenting specialized knowledge on a topic acquired through the training and 
experience of their profession, trade or hobby.  A trial court typically dismisses a challenge to a 
witness’ qualification to testify as an expert, particularly when offering specialized knowledge, as an 
argument that goes to weight and not admissibility. 
 
Law enforcement witnesses, based upon their experience investigating criminal cases and 
other skills, do develop specialized knowledge that could assist a jury in understanding issues in a 
criminal case.  For instance, law enforcement witnesses may define, translate or provide context to 
other evidence or testimony in the case.  Law enforcement witnesses testify about the meaning of 
testimony and evidence not familiar to the jury in the context of the crime alleged.73  For instance, an 
ordinary person may attach little meaning to hundreds of small, plastic bags and several scales 
recovered from the defendant’s residence.74  Under Daubert, a witness qualified based upon his 
experience and specialized knowledge about drug evidence is reliable and helpful to the jury.   
 
Unfortunately, there are other, more problematic, varieties of expert testimony from law 
enforcement witnesses.  Law enforcement witnesses far too often have a role in the criminal case 
and, thus, an obvious interest in its outcome.  It is when the specialized knowledge of the law 
enforcement expert derives from that unique bias that the trial court must protect the criminal 
defendant from the so-called expert testimony.  Some trial courts instead roll over.  This explains 
why Professor Risinger feared that “criminal defendants would not be protected from . . . 
undependable expert testimony”75 and why testimony from law enforcement witnesses “almost 
always allowed to testify” may be some of the best evidence of a “true systematic bias.”76     
                                                 
73  See United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002)(upholding the trial court decision admitting expert 
testimony that drug importation operations use GPS to facilitate air drops and boat to boat transfers and use cell phones 
to enable boat to ground communication).   
74 See United States v. Pina, 138 Fed. Appx. 336 (1st Cir. 2005)(unpublished opinion)(admitting testimony from a police 
officer that scales, packages of cash and sandwich baggies are “consistent with [drug] distribution”).  These witnesses 
also translate code words and other jargon familiar to participants and investigators only.  The one area that appellate 
courts have limited law enforcement witnesses is when interpreting “ordinary words” or describing evidence in a 
criminal case that needs no accompanying explanation.  See United States v. Londono Tabarez, 121 Fed. Appx. 882, No. 
02-1558 (2d Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (finding harmless error when the trial court permitted an agent called to 
translate meaning of "drug code" but also other language used in defendants' taped conversations).  In Londono Tabarez, 
the witness, among other things, testified about the meaning of ordinary expressions within average juror's 
understanding, such as "bring it up here" and "pain in the neck" and the Second Circuit found harmless error.  There is 
likely no specialized knowledge that can assist a jury in understanding some words and phrases or law enforcement is not 
in any better position to translate.  They have the same meaning in the drug context as they do elsewhere in life, or they 
are not “code words” at all.  See also United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2004)(reversing a conviction 
where the agent testified about the meaning of "watching somebody's back" as used by defendant). 
75 Navigating, supra note 7, at 100. 
76 Navigating, supra note 7, at 132-35. 





Most applicable here, the other varieties of expert testimony from law enforcement best 
exemplifies a trial court’s disparate treatment of the government and the criminal defendant under 
the helpfulness prong.  The reliability prong does not apply neatly to expert testimony from a 
witness offering “specialized knowledge” predominantly gained from experience.  For this reason, 
some trial courts have found that Daubert does not apply to non-scientific witnesses such as law 
enforcement witnesses.77  Other courts do not reference Daubert or other reliability factors in 
deciding admissibility of specialized knowledge experts.78  All that lies between irrelevant, unhelpful 
and unfairly prejudicial “expert” testimony from a law enforcement witness and the jury’s ears, may 
be the helpfulness prong.  As distinguished from the many arrows reserved for false identification 
expert testimony discussed above, trial courts clear the path for law enforcement witnesses 
regardless of the nature of the testimony or the bias from which it is based.79  
 
Law enforcement witnesses present several other problems for the criminal defendant.  
Even before they are permitted to testify as experts, jurors place enhanced reliability and credibility 
in testimony offered by law enforcement witnesses.80  Law enforcement experts also create 
complications involving inadequate disclosure, testimony in the form of legal conclusions and unfair 
surprise at trial.81  If there were a time to require more from a proponent of expert testimony, then a 
trial court should require more from the government presenting expert testimony from a law 
enforcement witness.  But they do not. 
         
1. Excludable testimony offered by law enforcement experts 
 
The prosecution may present expert testimony from law enforcement officers in several 
common, yet impermissible, factual scenarios.  Law enforcement officers serving as experts 
commonly testify about modus operandi or the criminal “profiling” of the defendant.82  Prosecutors 
                                                 
77 See, e.g. United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Daubert does not apply to non-
scientific expert testimony from a law enforcement officer); United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 320-22 (5th Cir. 
1997) (same). 
78 See, e.g. United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998) (glossing over reliability and admitting expert 
testimony from a law enforcement witness); United States v. Taylor, 18 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). 
79  See D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and ‘Offender Profiling’: Some 
Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 193 (2003). 
80 The standard jury instruction read, but not necessarily obeyed, reads as, “[t]he testimony of law enforcement officers 
must be weighed by the same standards you apply to every other witness.  The testimony of law enforcement witnesses 
should not be given any greater or lesser weight merely because of their jobs.” Defendant’s Requested Preliminary Jury 
Instructions ¶ 20, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, available at 
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/RC_DP_MotionsManual/235950_RqstdPrelimJryInstrcts.doc (last visited Jan. 13, 2010). 
81 Navigating, supra note 7, at 131-35 (using the terms “summerizational” or “educational” experts in discussing both law 
enforcement and false identification experts). 
82 The Sixth Circuit has specifically held that law enforcement officers can give opinion testimony regarding a whether a 
defendant's conduct is indicative of intent, because law enforcement officers have specific knowledge beyond that of an 
average layman regarding the methods and techniques employed in an area of criminal activity.  See United States v. 
Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 940 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir.1990)). 




also improperly call law enforcement witnesses to summarize the investigation or the trial itself.83  
Some trial courts regularly permit law enforcement experts, therefore, to offer testimony that 
classifies the defendant, his actions or the evidence against him.  
 
Trial courts have admitted, and reviewing courts upheld, testimony by a trained police officer 
explaining “that a defendant's activities were consistent with a common criminal modus operandi.”84  
Criminal profiling, on the other hand, is an investigative tool used to develop leads and not a hard 
science or sufficiently reliable for expert testimony.85  Unreliable and unhelpful criminal profiling can 
be difficult to distinguish from law enforcement expert testimony about modes operandi, 
particularly in gang86 and drug offenses.87  An appellate court affirming the trial courts decision to 
admit the expert testimony described that the modus operandi “evidence helps the jury to 
understand complex criminal activities and alerts it to the possibility that combinations of seemingly 
innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior.”88  For example, law enforcement experts testify 
that the defendant has the characteristics of a child molester89 or that the defendant’s operation in a 
fraud trial has all the “hallmarks of a ponzi scheme.”90   
 
                                                 
83 See generally United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that jurors were not “helped” by 
opinion testimony that informed them “what was in the evidence” and “what inferences to draw from it”); 
84 Courts disfavor profiling as “substantive evidence of guilt.”  United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th 
Cir. 1991).  Yet, even in other contexts, courts have acknowledged the “fine line between potentially improper profile 
evidence and acceptable specialized testimony.”  United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000); see also 
United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1050 (11th Cir. 1991).   
85 See James Aaron George, Offender Profiling and Expert Testimony; Scientifically Valid or Glorified results, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
221 (2008)(arguing against the admissibility of expert testimony concerning true criminal profiling). 
86 Gang cases demonstrate the problem.  See generally United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding 
the trial court’s decision to permit a government expert to explain, at the defendant’s RICO trial, the defendant’s gang 
was involved in narcotics trafficking, a “racketeering activity”); see also People v. Martinez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49, 58 (2003) 
(permitting expert testimony that a gang ordinarily will exact revenge upon a gang member who reveals gang confidences 
– as the defendant did here); People v. Killebrew, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876 (2002)(holding as improper testimony from an 
expert on criminal street gangs, that when one gang member in a car possesses a gun, every other gang member in the 
car knows of the gun and will constructively possess the gun for their protection).  
87 Trial courts also permit improper profiling evidence in drug cases.  See, e.g., United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752 (7th 
Cir. 2005)(upholding expert testimony about the defendant’s modes operandi); United States v. Correa., 402 F.3d 752 
(7th Cir. 2005)(upholding the admission of expert testimony on drug trafficking and “counter-surveillance techniques”); 
United States v. Gwynn, No. 03-4293 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished); but see United States v. Barrera Medina, No. 03-
10455 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (finding harmless error when the trial court admitted testimony by law enforcement 
officer on use of weapons and counter surveillance by drug traffickers); People v. Duvardo, 2004 WL 2458585 at *16 
(Cal. Ct. App.).  Some prosecutors push the boundaries of modus operandi opinions including in cases when such 
opinion do not relate to the charges.  See, e.g., United States v. Pineda Torres, 287 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2002)(reversing the 
trial court’s decision to admit testimony from customs agent about the modus operandi of drug trafficking organizations 
in a possession with intent to distribute case and when conspiracy is not charged). 
88 See Webb, 115 F.3d at 714.     
89 See, e.g., United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 2005)(upholding the trial court decision to allow a law 
enforcement expert’s testimony in a child exploitation trial that the defendant meets the general profile of a child 
molester including that they are often authority figures like police officers, they often have their victims spend the night, 
they take photos of their victim and they are often apprehended only after someone else finds pictures). 
90 See, e.g. United States v. Long, 300 Fed. Appx. 804 (11th Cir. 2008)(upholding the admission of expert testimony that 
defendant's operation of payday loan company bore “the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme”). 




As clear as it may seem that this type of testimony from a law enforcement expert is not 
helpful, potentially invasive of the jury’s role of deciding guilt, extremely prejudicial and highly likely 
to cause confusion of issues for the jury, trial courts simply are not weighing helpfulness the same 
way.  Trial courts rarely discuss the same concepts or use the same language featured in the false 
identification expert discussion above.  Expert testimony offered against the criminal defendant 
should encounter similar judicial scrutiny and protection from undue prejudice and confusion.  Trial 
courts must not sleep at the gates particularly when considering testimony from law enforcement 
experts already given a pass through the reliability prong.  
 
2. Helpfulness abandoned 
 
Testimony from law enforcement may be based on specialized knowledge, it may be 
presented through a professional with expert qualifications, it may be based upon extensive 
experience and training and it may derive from reliable methods.  However, to ask the questions 
posed to the defendant’s expert, how can testimony that unfairly characterizes the defendant into a 
“guilty” association help the jury?91  When trial courts permit a law enforcement expert to classify 
the defendant as part of a group or as having engaged in associative activity, it increases the 
likelihood of conviction through his association with that group or activity.  How can this testimony 
not invade the jury’s province of deciding guilt?  How can it not unfairly prejudice the defendant 
against whom it is offered?  
 
The federal rules of evidence specifically provide for exceptions and provisions to be applied 
in the criminal context or, more specifically to the criminal defendant or the government.  Nowhere 
do the federal rules reference a different relevance standard under Rules 401 and 402 for the 
government.  Nor do the rules reference a different helpfulness prong under Rule 702 for the 
government.  While trial courts can and do render inconsistent evidentiary determinations, 
particularly in different jurisdictions, here, the determinations more systematically favor the 
government and prejudice the accused.   
 
To contrast expert witnesses on eyewitness identification, sometimes excluded under 
helpfulness, provide juries with scientific knowledge based upon years of advances in research and 
objectively reliable methods that refutes the jury’s common assumption on the topic.  Profiling 
testimony by the “law enforcement expert,” commonly admitted under helpfulness, is based 
exclusively on the witness’ experience, bias and interest in the case.  It does not follow that 
information about the fallibility of eyewitness identifications is less helpful to the trier of fact than 
profiling testimony calling the defendant a “drug dealer” or opining that his operation had all the 
hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme.  Worse yet, the irreconcilable determinations follow suit on appeal.   
 
                                                 
91 See supra Section III.C.1 (discussing that expert testimony about witness identifications is excluded as not “beyond the 
ken of the ordinary juror”); cf. United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the admissibility 
of a law enforcement witness’s expert testimony regarding, inter alia, “the technique of using codes with beepers to 
signal the identity of the caller, and the use of cash and nicknames or false names by drug traffickers”).  Thus, jurors do 
not sufficiently understand that drug dealers use false names, but they do understand on their own the counter-intuitive 
assumptions, misconceptions and fallibility of eyewitness identifications.    




IV. Admissibility Decisions on Expert Testimony Escape, and Will Continue to 
Escape, Meaningful Review  
        
Trial courts’ disparate evidentiary determinations governing reliable expert testimony remain 
insulated from meaningful review and public perception.  The highly deferential “abuse of 
discretion” standard of review and the grand safety net of harmless error serve to protect decisions 
on expert testimony based upon who was asking.  A principal purpose of appellate review is to 
provide guidance in future cases by resolving legal questions of importance beyond their role in the 
specific case.  The appellate decisions in the areas discussed above provide, and will continue to 
provide, little to no assistance to the criminal defendant proposing expert testimony in his case.  As 
discussed in Part V, the reviewing courts should conduct de novo review in certain, limited 
circumstances and, for his contribution, the criminal defendant can compose a trial record that 
allows reviewing courts to understand the issues discussed in this article. 
 
A. Abuse of Discretion Standard 
 
The standard for appellate review for almost all decisions regarding expert testimony is abuse 
of discretion.  Abuse of discretion governs trial court decisions about the qualifications of the 
expert, the reliability of the expert’s methods and its helpfulness.92  The abuse of discretion standard 
is the most deferential to a trial court's rulings.93  This standard is so deferential that the appellate 
court must uphold the trial court's decision if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the 
case, “even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its decision.”94  Even if the trial court does 
not specifically state the reasons for its decision, the appellate court “must assume the trial court had 
a correct reason in mind, as long as any reasoning supports the trial court's decision.”  The standard 
of review itself explains how the unfair admissibility determination survives so often on appeal.   
 
A look at the lower court decisions rooted in helpfulness reveals that, like other relevance 
decisions, they are not often disturbed on appeal.95  The inequity carries forward through the appeal: 
that is, decisions to admit the government’s expert testimony are not disturbed as an abuse of 
discretion and reviewing courts affirm decisions to exclude the defendant’s expert testimony as not 
an abuse of discretion.96  The prejudice to the defendant discussed in this article may persist because 
these decisions by trial courts are left to their discretion.   
 
                                                 
92 Court reviews for abuse of discretion the admission and exclusion of expert opinion testimony, whether based on: (1) 
the qualifications of the expert; (2) the proponent’s failure to demonstrate reliability under Fed. R. Evid. 702, Daubert and 
other reliability tests used in some states; or (3) admissibility, fit or relevance, including “prejudice, confusion, or waste 
of time” under Fed. R. Evid. 403.  United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001). 
93 See United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
94 Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 
95 See infra Section VI.B (discussing the criminal defendant’s role in providing a clearer record of abuse); cf. Campbell v. 
People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991) (reversing the state trial court who failed to admit the defendant’s expert testimony 
concerning witness identification). 
96 Navigating, supra note 7, at 104-10 (surveying both district court and circuit court cases and concluding similarly poor 
results for the criminal defendant).  




B. The Harmless Error Veil 
 
Harmless error presents an additional, and often more substantial, hurdle for the criminal 
defendant looking beyond the trial court for relief.97  “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights” shall be disregarded as harmless.98  In practice, the harmless 
error analysis denigrates a finding of error to a mere procedural footnote, wherein no relief is 
afforded to the accused in the instant case or, for that matter, to a similarly situated defendant 
before the same trial court.99  The bidirectional nature of harmless error equates to the criminal 
defendant likely to be run over in both directions.  So infrequently do reviewing courts find error 
with respect to expert testimony that then calling it harmless muffles any noise of judicial 
protectionism or the subjective value judgments about the defendant and his case.100 
 
The best plea against the current rate of harmless error findings in the area of expert witness 
testimony is that this error should not so readily be deemed harmless to the defendant.  As discussed 
above, trial courts treat expert testimony and admissibility decisions about expert testimony 
differently.  Appellate courts should consider the weight of such testimony in its harmless error 
analysis.  Whether he was not permitted his own expert or forced to endure the presentation of an 
impermissible government witness, the error concerns a critical aspect of the trial and a witness who 
likely was afforded, or could have been afforded, great attention and weight by the jury.  Whether 
robbed of his opportunity to present expert testimony or convicted by an impermissible government 
expert’s testimony, there should be more findings than currently reflected in published decisions that 
the trial courts’ admissibility decision affected the criminal defendant’s “substantial rights.”         
 
V. The Cry for De Novo Review in Limited Circumstances and, in the Alternative, 
Uncovering Abuse in Trial Courts’ Discretion  
 
Appellate courts are capable of remedying the larger problem of incongruous admissibility 
determinations and the injustice for criminal defendants.  Reviewing courts only access abuse within 
the trial record in a specific case, as opposed to a disparate impact analysis including other trial court 
decisions admitting government experts.101  This article presents two options.  First, in the limited 
circumstances, the criminal defendant should be entitled to the less deferential standard of de novo 
                                                 
97 An appellate court may “hesitate to step in” because even if it were error to exclude the expert's testimony, such error 
was “harmless” to the defendant.  See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 135 (1974).  A reviewing court will likely 
not be able to conclude that “it is more probable than not the [exclusion] affected the verdict.”  United States v. 
Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1982). 
98 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see e.g. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that an error is 
deemed harmless “unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had 
such effect”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
99 See generally State v. Garcia, 2002 WL 1874535 at *17 (Ohio Ct. App.)(finding the trial court’s error in admitting a law 
enforcement witness, who concluded for the jury in an arson case that the fire was result of an arson, was harmless).  
100 Appellate courts review the exclusion of the defendant’s expert not based upon whether the exclusion affected the 
defendant’s case, but whether it affected his guilty verdict. See Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107-08 (discussing other “corroborating 
evidence” implicating the defendant as the perpetrator); Kime, 99 F.3d at 885 (same).   
101 See infra Section VI.B (advocating that the criminal defendant supplement the record with respect to the helpfulness 
prong with information from other cases decided by the same trial court).  




review.  Second, when confronted with the more bleak abuse of discretion standard, the criminal 
defendant should do more at the trial court level in assembling a trial record reflective of the 
inequities profiled in this article and borrowed from other courts’ findings.   
 
 A. De Novo Review in Limited Circumstances 
 
A de novo standard of review allows the appellate court to revisit the trial court's decision 
independently on the entire trial record related to the proposed expert testimony.  The reviewing 
court conducts an independent analysis, forms its own conclusions and compares its findings with 
the trial courts findings in determining error.102  Reviewing courts should engage in de novo review in 
two limited circumstances.   
 
The first instance, provided for in the law, requires the reviewing court to expand or actually 
utilize a threshold inquiry under Daubert.  That is, a reviewing court first undertakes a de novo review 
of whether the trial court “followed the standard set forth in Daubert.”103  The second limited 
circumstance for the heightened review, not currently provided for but proposed here, is warranted 
in circumstances where the criminal defendant can demonstrate that the trial court applied different 
admissibility standards related to expert testimony for the government and the defendant.  This 
heightened standard of review should be available when the accused can make such a showing on 
the trial record, when the disparate standards and findings occurred in the same case or in other 
cases decided by the same trial court.   
 
1. The de novo review already in place 
 
Seldom cited, the de novo standard of review already has a place in the appellate analysis of 
expert witness testimony.  When a party challenges the acceptance or rejection of expert scientific 
testimony on appeal, reviewing courts is supposed to first undertake a de novo review of whether the 
district court properly followed the framework set forth in Daubert.104  Not a lot of meaning, 
however, has been attributed to “following the framework” language or to the analysis on appeal.  
Most appellate courts find that the trial court cited the Court’s case in Daubert enough to satisfy the 
issue.   
 
As the proponent of excluded expert testimony, the criminal defendant is entitled to judicial 
findings addressing both the reliability and helpfulness prong.  This is fundamental to “following the 
framework” in Daubert.  Many trial courts, however, like proponents themselves, conflate the issues 
of reliability and admissibility.  Some appellate courts, although failing to cite de novo review, have 
exercised their independent judgment and remanded to the trial court to make findings in concert 
                                                 
102 In de novo review, the appellate court must review the record in light of its own independent judgment without 
giving special weight to the prior decision. 
103 See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1101 (7th Cir. 1999). 
104 See id. 




with the two-prong test set forth in Daubert.105  One note of progress in the last ten years is that trial 
courts more often recognize the need to conduct hearings and articulate findings concerning expert 
witness testimony and under Daubert.     
 
2.  De novo review in other limited circumstances 
 
The proposal for heightened review in certain other circumstances is also required.  Because 
the trial court likely treated the expert witness testimony differently and afforded it more weight in 
the admissibility determination, appellate courts should not permit trial courts to decide an 
evidentiary issue related to it one way for the government and another for the criminal defendant.  
If, within the trial record, there is sufficient evidence that the trial court has applied different 
standards for the government and the criminal defendant under Daubert and Rule 702, then the 
reviewing court should be able to review the defendant’s claim de novo.   
 
Critics will argue that appellate courts cannot review every admissibility determination 
related to expert testimony de novo.  The limited circumstances of the proposal include when the same 
trial court allowed in the government’s expert testimony and excluded the defendant’s using 
inconsistent reasoning.  The appellate courts will not be bogged down with revisiting all admissibility 
decisions about experts.  Only when a trial record contains competent evidence that the same trial 
court may have applied the Daubert standard disparately will the standard of review shift.  In these 
limited instances, the reviewing court should review and compare the entire Daubert inquiry 
independently.   
 
As discussed below, a more full trial record also should permit citations, transcripts and 
written findings of the instant trial court’s analysis of government expert testimony in other cases.  
Trial courts conducting analysis under Daubert and Rule 702 regularly draw upon guidance of other 
trial courts’ consideration of similar issues.  Typically in the reliability prong, trial courts will adopt 
the reasoning and even the factual findings with respect to a Daubert factor as used in a case passing on 
the specific expert or type of expert testimony at issue.  A criminal defendant would also be well 
served by incorporating prior helpfulness determinations by the same trial court for review on 
appeal. 
 
B. Requiring a Better Record for Abuse  
 
The abuse of discretion standard has never been especially friendly to defendants in terms of 
relief.  Evidentiary determinations about expert witness testimony are no exception.  Professor 
Risinger, in his article, laid some blame with the criminal defense bar.  Today, with more than 16 
years of post-Daubert cases, some trial courts seem to be more to blame.  Defendants, however, 
should demand from the trial courts findings that comport with the Daubert and Rule 702 analysis 
and compose a more thorough trial record that incorporates other determinations by the same trial 
court in other cases. 
                                                 
105 United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide issue related to Daubert 
until the trial court made findings on reliability and admissibility). 





The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mathis106 is instructive.  The Mathis Court 
remanded requiring the trial court to support its findings, including its treatment of the helpfulness 
prong, with substance, not conclusions. 
We find it difficult to accord the customary degree of deference to 
the District Court's discretion in this case because the District Court 
explained its ruling with little more than a series of conclusions:  
[T]his testimony has the probability of confusing and misleading the 
jury. . . . [T]here is a probability that there will be unfair prejudice 
here. The aura of reliability that's attached to an expert witness, I 
believe, is significant. Listening to this expert, it seems to me, that the 
testimony itself has the potential, if not controlling probability of 
confusing the jury. . . . [Sergeant Gubbei's] testimony is, I think, clear. 
Whether the jury accepts it or not, how the jury accepts it is clearly 
within their province. I do not see how this evidence will do 
anything, other than to confuse and mislead the jury.107   
Trial courts tend to address the Daubert framework and the helpfulness prong like the lower court in 
Mathis if not urged by the proponent of the expert testimony, the government in Mathis.   
The criminal defendant, through his presentation in support of the expert testimony, can 
prompt an appellate court to demand more.  A proponent’s presentation should mirror the two 
prongs of the test: reliability and helpfulness.  A trial court rendering Daubert determinations is 
accustomed to litigants who reference, borrow and adopt repeatedly from outside the immediate 
case before the court.  The reliability prong, for example, may be met with research, empirical data, 
commissioned studies and countless findings by other trial courts.  Trial court decisions similarly 
incorporate the work of litigants in other cases.  There is no reason that the criminal defendant 
cannot similarly draw upon other trial court determinations in support of his helpfulness arguments.  
As advocated here, criminal defendants should reference, borrow and adopt from expert witness 
determinations made by the same trial court in other cases.  The criminal defendant may benefit from 
including language and standards used by the same trial court in other cases considering the admissibility 
of government experts, particularly law enforcement witnesses. 
With a more developed record, a criminal defendant will be in a better position to 
demonstrate the way a single trial court exercises its discretion in the important area of expert 
witness testimony.  Hopefully, this wider view of the trial court’s inquiry may provide an easier path 
to an abuse of discretion finding when appropriate.  It may be that, as a collateral benefit, the trial 
courts exercising judicial protectionism and injecting their subjective value judgments into their 
                                                 
106 264 F.3d 321 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
107 Id. at 338. 




determinations change course when confronted with this type of trial record.  If left unchanged, 
then government’s experts, especially those offering mere specialized knowledge, will continue to 
parade into court to testify, while expert witnesses proposed by the criminal defendant, including 
those professionals presenting reliable and necessary information to the jury, will remain on the 
outside looking in.  The appellate courts can, and should, cure this injustice for the accused in the 
critical area of expert witness testimony.  For now, the problem is repeating, yet evading review. 
